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EQUALITY AT THE CEMETERY GATES: STUDY OF AN 
AFRICAN AMERICAN BURIAL GROUND
By William A. Engelhart*
I. Introduction
In Charlottesville, Virginia, the University Cemetery serves as the 
final resting place of many of the most prominent community members 
of the University of Virginia. In 2011, the University planned an expan-
sion. During archaeological research to this end, sixty-seven previously 
unidentified interments, in both adult and child-sized grave shafts, were 
discovered on the proposed site of expansion, to the northeast of the 
University Cemetery. Further archival research revealed that “at least two 
late nineteenth century references note that enslaved African Americans 
were buried north of but outside the enclosed University, in an adjacent 
wooded area.”1 In one, Col. Charles Christian Wertenbaker recalls: “in
old times, the University servants were buried on the north side of the 
cemetery, just outside of the wall.”2 Current research suggests that at least 
as late as 1898 the area of land was recognized as historically utilized by 
the University of Virginia for “servant” burials.3 Since these discoveries, a 
cemmemoration ceremony has been held.4 Some beautification measures 
have been undertaken: a specially designed fence has been installed; some 
trees have been planted; and at both entrances an informational sign is 
posted explaining the significance of the plot. Still, this newly rediscov-
ered sacred space stands in stark contrast to the marble tombs and gilded 
cenotaphs of the University Cemetery and adjacent Confederate monu-
ment.
* The author would like to thank Professor Michael Doran for his invaluable sup-
port, insight and guidance.
1. RIVANNA ARCHAEOLOGICAL SERVICES, LLC, BEYOND THE WALLS: AN AFRICAN 
AMERICAN BURIAL GROUND AT THE UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA, 23 (2013).
2. Id.
3. Id. at iii.
4. Anne E. Bromley, U.VA. Group Honors Unknown Slaves at Burial Site, Sets Stage for 
Future Work, UVATODAY (Oct. 16, 2014), https://news.virginia.edu/content/uva-
group-honors-unknown-slaves-burial-site-sets-stage-future-work.
2 Michigan Journal of Race & Law [VOL. 25:1
Typically, descendants of the dead reserve rights in a cemetery in 
the form of some kind of property interest.5 Mourners and the children 
of mourners may return from time to time to pay their respects and tend 
to the graves of their dearly departed. In general, this is a well-established 
right (though further investigation will reveal that it somewhat less clear 
than one might expect).6 However, slavery in America has frustrated 
many rights, and its long shadow continues to disrupt others. Because of 
the nature of this property interest, today in Charlottesville, the cemetery 
rights of the descendants of those slaves interred to the northeast of the 
University Cemetery are arguably extinguished, or at best unclear. The 
owner of the cemetery, the University of Virginia, has made no attempt 
to exclude or to sell the land, nor likely would they, but it is unclear that 
they could not should they so desire. There are likely other slave cemeter-
ies, on public and private land, that find themselves in a similar situation: 
specifically, slave cemeteries and African American burial grounds that, 
because of systemic oppression and discrimination, are rendered unpro-
tected and abandoned—descendants’ rights vanished into nothing.
In exploration of this problem, this paper lays out the historical legal 
landscape of cemeteries, the special issues that arise in slave cemeteries 
generally, and the application of these doctrines to the African American 
burial ground in Charlottesville. Additionally, it presents a suggested legal 
treatment of this special type of property interest: namely, that there 
should be legislative reform that, in the case of abandoned slave cemeter-
ies, creates both a public easement allowing access and broad statutory 
standing so that communities can work together to maintain these sacred 
sites and police against desecration. Further, the development of the 
rights of sepulture in American common law and the accompanying legal 
solicitude would allow judges to read this regime into existence, even in 
absence of formal legislative measures.
II. Grave Law
Respect for hallowed ground can be a strong motivator. As one 
scholar noted, the land underlying the former World Trade Center, some 
of the most valuable real estate in the world, was set aside after the events 
of September 11, 2001 as consecrated and no longer appropriate for 
commercial development or even private ownership.7 In its place stands 
the National September 11th Memorial and Museum, a testament to the 
5. See infra Part II.
6. See infra Part II.
7. Mary L. Clark, Treading on Hallowed Ground: Implications for Property Law and Critical 
Theory of Land Associated with Human Death and Burial, 94 KY. L.J. 487, 489-490 (2005).
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widespread agreement that memorial property stands apart.8 Many au-
thors have remarked on the seemingly unusual treatment of memorial 
spaces generally and burial grounds in particular.  As one wrote, “. . . at 
the outset it must be emphasized that a cemetery lot is treated for most 
purposes as being unlike any other piece of real or personal property.”9
The motivation for this unusual treatment is not surprising. Death and 
mourning are part of the human experience and necessarily implicate the 
management of the cadaver. Funeral custom can take many forms, and in 
some societies (including our own), burial in the earth is not uncommon. 
As expected, the weight of tradition and ritual is bound up with the body 
in the land, and as one court explained: “our reverence . . . creates a 
strong natural desire that it shall never be disturbed or desecrated, and 
that the place where it rests shall be regarded as consecrated ground, and 
its beauty preserved until the end of time.”10
This compelling dictum, if vague, alludes to a number of rights 
contained in a cemetery lot. There appears to be some protection against 
desecration; but also, unsurprisingly, a right to access the graveyard to 
mourn and maintain, and often a right to bury other relatives on the 
property.11 Mary L. Clark describes an even broader series of legal protec-
tions that cut across the breadth of property law, special treatment she 
calls “solicitude.”12 Under her analysis, legal protection granted to parcels 
of land associated with human death and burial include a protection 
against adverse possession, an inability to be partitioned or mortgaged, 
and an immunity from taxation.13 The shifting bundle of rights related to 
the burial of the dead can be referred to, somewhat archaically, as the 
“right of sepulture.”14
What is unusual then is not that jurists should feel motivated to 
grant special protections to burial grounds, but rather that these protec-
tions were constructed—somewhat inconsistently—out of the seemingly 
inadequate building blocks of Anglo-American property law. Indeed, 
throughout the Middle Ages and even into the mid-19th century, the 
Christian Church maintained exclusive control over the regulation of in-
8. Id. at 490.
9. R.S., Note, The Cemetery Lot: Rights and Restrictions, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 378, 378 
(1961).
10. Clark, supra note 7, at 507.
11. Alfred L. Brophy, Grave Matters: The Ancient Rights of the Graveyard, 2006 BYU L.
REV. 1469, 1479 (2006).
12. Clark, supra note 7, at 496-505.
13. Id.
14. PERCIVAL E. JACKSON, THE LAW OF CADAVERS AND OF BURIAL AND BURIAL 
PLACES 27 (2d ed. 1950). Alternatively, “sepulcher.” However, some sources maintain 
that the right of sepulture refers only to the right, before burial, to be buried and, after 
burial, not to be dug up. Id.
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terment in England, and canon law was exclusively applied.15 Crucial to 
this system was the fact that the Church of England was the one and only 
church and that it largely owned all burial places.16 Because of this, ceme-
tery law at the time of the American Revolution was contained in eccle-
siastical law.17 When the United States rejected the establishment of a sin-
gle state church, it created a sizable legal void regarding burial places.18
Since Congress and state legislatures mostly ignored the issue, most “dis-
putes in the 18th and 19th centuries were litigated . . . and early Ameri-
can jurists were charged with resolving them under common law rules.”19
In the 21st century, state statutory law gives some guidance, but much of 
the shape of the law of burial places still derives from U.S. common law 
developed after the American Revolution.
One primary issue is the difficulty in determining exactly what kind 
of property interest these rights stem from. Courts have most frequently 
construed it as either some kind of easement or license; but as one scholar 
noted, courts have even read a cemetery lot deed as a security to prevent 
speculation.20 Occasionally, jurisdictions have described the right as a 
qualified fee,21 but often even deeds purporting to convey a fee have been 
held to convey an easement only.22 All things considered, it might be 
more useful to look at the treatment of the right of sepulture generally. 
As described in a law review article from the 1960s:
Inasmuch as courts rarely reach divergent results merely on the 
basis of the label attached to the interest, it is more realistic to 
acknowledge the unique way in which cemetery lots are treat-
ed; otherwise the true issues are confused and concealed by 
arbitrarily assigning real property tags which have the charac-
teristics desired for the resolution of a particular case conso-
15. Jackson, supra note 14, at 21-22. That is, until the English Burial Acts in 1855. Id.
16. Tanya D. Marsh, When Dirt and Death Collide: Legal and Property Interests in Burial 
Places, 30(2) PROB. & PROP. MAG. March/April 2016.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 2.
19. Id.
20. R.S., supra note 9, at 379. “Cemetery lots have a pronounced tendency to rise in 
price over a period of time as a result of two factors: additional improvements which en-
hance the appearance of the cemetery, and the constant depletion of available burial 
space . . . In an attempt to exploit this commercial truth, unscrupulous promoters have 
promised huge profits on resale to encourage purchases of large quantities of lots of in-
vestment purposes.” Id. at 395.
21. Id. at 380.
22. Jackson, supra note 14, at 358.
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nant with an appropriate though enunciated theory of ceme-
tery law.23
A leading treatise on the topic, contemporary to the law review article, 
muses on proposed property designations before capitulating: “in any 
event, an interest in real property.”24 That being said, the property inter-
est is most commonly described as an easement in gross held by the rela-
tives of the buried person, and it descends by operation of law but is nei-
ther devisable nor alienable.25 This construction will be used to analyze 
the right of sepulture generally, and later when dealing with the wrinkles 
that arise in slave cemeteries.
The existence of this easement is evaluated based on three main 
components: some kind of dedication, a determination that the cemetery 
has not been abandoned, and some type of connection between those 
buried and those seeking access.26 The standard for dedication appears to 
be rather low. As one commentator puts it, “the presence of a headstone 
seems to be sufficient to establish dedication, but less may be sufficient.”27
In its most straightforward form, dedication can result from a determina-
tion that the landowner initially consented to the burial. However, some 
small acknowledgement by the owner that people were being openly 
buried in the cemetery is certainly enough.28 Interestingly, this process of 
dedication appears to express legal solicitude–the special treatment de-
scribed by Clark–since dedication in the form of the conveyance of an 
express easement does not seem to have to satisfy the statute of frauds as 
would be typically required.29 Indeed, “the common law of implied dedi-
cation emphasized that no particular act or ceremony was required to ac-
complish a dedication,” but many states (including Arizona, California, 
Hawaii, Indiana, Montana, Oregon, Texas, and Washington) now for-
23. R.S., supra note 9, at 380.
24. Jackson, supra note 14, at 359.
25. Brophy, supra note 12, at 1479. Some cases refer to “heirs” instead of “relatives”
which would apply strictly to those who succeed in intestate succession. “Presumably the 
term is intended to include named individuals (devisees and legatees) intestate succession 
as well; succeeding generations of descendants become problematic.” RICHARD B.
CUNNINGHAM, ARCHAEOLOGY, RELICS, AND THE LAW 582 n.51 (2d ed. 2005). There is 
a marked departure here from ecclesiastical law in England, since the easement was based 
on a doctrine of “temporary appropriation of soil.” The right generated by the burial 
would terminate with the dissolution of the body. Jackson, supra note 15, at 354. This is 
not the regime in the United States, where permanent appropriation is the rule. Id. at 
356.
26. Brophy, supra note 11, at 1490-92.
27. Id. at 1491.
28. See id.
29. See Jackson, supra note 14, at 221.
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malize dedication by statute, requiring a map of the cemetery boundaries 
and some kind of written instrument.30
Additionally, courts are very willing to accept that the easement can 
be established without the landowner’s consent, by prescription.31 Further 
solicitude is demonstrated in the prescriptive easement process since the 
law of property typically requires continued use for a period specified by 
state statute, but it seems that this kind of easement can be established as 
soon as the body is buried. As one old treatise puts it, “in truth, whether 
or not the body has been interred for a prescriptive period should be of 
little moment, except that the reasons are graver that abhor the disturb-
ance of the dead while the wounds of separation are fresh in the hearts of 
the living.”32 In other words, even as a practical concern, the ten or 
twenty year period required by statute is the period during which a fami-
ly would fight most passionately to protect the grave and during which 
judges seem typically reluctant to disturb the dead.33 While still a member 
of the New York Court of Appeals, Justice Cardozo explained that “[t]he 
dead are to rest where they have been laid unless reason of substance is 
brought forward for disturbing their repose.”34
The second basis for the property interest is the determination that 
the cemetery has not been abandoned. In general, courts require “con-
tinuing use of the cemetery or at least some continuing recognition that 
bodies are buried there.”35 This is true even in cases where the cemetery 
is no longer maintained because the location was lost for good reason, an 
issue that will be explored infra as it relates to slave cemeteries. As one 
court noted, even in a case where abandonment occurs because a perse-
cuted sect chose not to advertise their gravesites through the erection of 
markers for fear of desecration, the easement is lost.36 In another instance, 
a court failed to stop a zoning variance which would allow construction 
over a cemetery in which there had been no new burials in a hundred 
years.37 However, in a minority of cases there may be some rights re-
tained even in an abandoned cemetery.38
30. Cunningham, supra note 25, at 580-81 (2d ed. 2005).
31. Brophy, supra note 11, at 1489-90.
32. Jackson, supra note 14, at 230.
33. See id.
34. Marsh, supra note 16, at 5 (quoting Yome v. Gorman, 152 N.E. 126, 129 (N.Y. 
1926)).
35. Brophy, supra note 11, at 1491.
36. Cunningham, supra note 25, at 590-91.
37. Brophy, supra note 11, at 1491.
38. See FLA. STAT. § 704.08 (2000) (noting a Florida statute allows family access to an 
abandoned cemetery).
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Finally, there is a requirement of connection between the dead and 
those attempting to assert their rights. As emphasized by Alfred L. Bro-
phy:
. . . [T]here likely must be a connection between those buried 
and those seeking access. No case articulates a requirement 
that those seeking access actually knew the people they are 
visiting. But it is possible that the people who are no longer 
able to trace a specific connection may have no greater right 
of access than members of the public.39
When an easement fails because no connection is established, the indi-
vidual attempting to assert their rights may have rights no greater than the 
public generally—which in many instances is no right at all.40 As dis-
cussed below, this requirement too creates special problems in the con-
text of historical African American cemeteries.
There is disagreement about the nature of the rights contained in 
burial grounds.41 The predominant view is, as mentioned, to treat a grave 
and the corresponding right as an affirmative easement in gross across sur-
rounding land to access the gravesite owned by the relatives of the de-
ceased, and often a right to additional burials by family members.42 To 
this, Brophy adds a restriction on the desecration of the graves and on the 
right of the owner of the graveyard to “sell or mortgage the property or 
use it in ways inconsistent with cemetery purposes.”43
The right of access is the most essential part of cemetery rights held 
by relatives of the interred. As Brophy puts it, “At base, [it] is an ease-
ment in gross to cross private property to access a cemetery.”44 Some state 
law provides for this right explicitly, but in other jurisdictions it is pre-
sumed by common law.45 Generally, this right is understood to be held 
by the relatives of the deceased, but some states have expanded the right 
statutorily. In West Virginia, for instance, a statute extends a right of ac-
cess to friends of the deceased; and in Virginia a statute provides access 
even to genealogical researchers.46 Some states require that a permit be 
obtained for access, but there is general agreement that there must be 
some amount of reasonable access.47 Exactly what counts as reasonable–in
39. Brophy, supra note 11, at 1492.
40. Cunningham, supra note 25, at 596.
41. Id. at 582.
42. Id. See also Brophy, supra note 11, at 1479.
43. Brophy, supra note 11, at 1479.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 1479.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 1489.
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terms of frequency, time of day, and length of visits–has stirred up some 
debate, with one court holding that a single four-hour visit per month is 
sufficient.48
Next is the right to bury more relatives in the cemetery, presuming
there is sufficient space.49 Though one article is quick to admit that, as a 
general matter, “permission to bury one person does not automatically 
give that person’s spouse a right of burial as well,”50 some states have 
gone so far as to give the spouse a vested right if there is at least one buri-
al space remaining.51 However, even in the absence of a statute some 
courts nevertheless presume its existence. In the 1911 case, Hines v. State,
the Tennessee Supreme Court stated: “The right of burial extends to all
the descendants of the owner who devoted the property to burial pur-
poses, and they may exercise it when the necessity arises.”52 Further, in 
1980, the Florida District Court of Appeals found the easement “for fu-
ture burial in unused grave sites to the extent that they are available.”53 In 
the absence of a statute designating the classes of persons entitled to buri-
al, courts have usually attempted to allocate remaining spaces determined 
by order of death.54 Brophy points out that the lack of commentary by 
courts renders the scope of this right unclear.55
There is also a right against desecration–necessitated by the right of 
access–if the owner of the plot (or a third party) destroys the grave be-
cause there will be nothing left to visit.56 Most straightforwardly, desecra-
tion is damage to the grave.57 As one court noted in 1933, “whoso dis-
turbs a dead body merely to suit his own convenience does so at his own 
risk.”58 Desecration often arises in circumstances where, against relatives’
wishes, a monument is defaced or decorative plants are removed.59 In the 
48. Id.
49. Brophy, supra note 11, at 1489. See also Cunningham, supra note 26 (“. . . and per-
haps even additional burial rights for successive members of the family.”).
50. R.S., supra note 9, at 396.
51. Id. at 398.
52. Brophy, supra note 11, at 1498 n.118.
53. Cunningham, supra note 25, at 580.
54. R.S., supra note 9, at 397 (“In the absence of such a statute, courts have attempted 
to allocate the remaining spaces, usually by applying the general rule that as between 
equal owners priority is determined by order of death.”).
55. Brophy, supra note 11, at 1498 n.118.
56. Id. at 1494.
57. Jackson, supra note 15, at 169.
58. Id. at 173.
59. R.S., supra note 9, at 394. Further examples can include the drilling of oil wells in 
an existing cemetery, plowing over graves, or the burial of a dog in an adjoining lot. See
also Jackson, supra note 14, at 170. It is worth noting that there are two dogs buried in the 
University Cemetery, former University of Virginia mascots.
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case of intentional desecration, the full range of legal and equitable relief, 
from damages to injunction, are typically available to relatives and de-
scendants.60
Finally, burial grounds are accompanied by restraints on alienation 
and restrictions on inconsistent use, which could be construed as rights 
or, in some instances, burdens.61 These restrictions are broad and affect 
both the owner of the servient estate and the owners of the easement. 
For example, courts have held it is likely not possible to sell or encumber 
a public cemetery.62 Other statutes make the cemetery lots indivisible.63
Further, once land is dedicated as a cemetery and a body has been buried, 
the owner of the servient estate cannot take back the dedication nor can 
anyone use the land inconsistently with this dedication.64
It is probably unfair to present this conflict in terms of a clash be-
tween the rights of the living and the rights of the dead. More clearly, 
“cemeteries pose a conflict between the rights of the living to have a 
memorial for the dead and the rights of other living people to use the 
land in (what to them is) a more productive fashion.”65 The doctrine of 
abandonment pushes back against dead hand control: “. . . when the 
names of the dead are no longer heard in the ears of men, and not even a 
trace of their memory remains . . . to perpetually preserve the soil as sa-
cred and hallowed ground, under such circumstances, does honor to nei-
ther the living nor the dead.”66
III. Slave Cemeteries
As a general matter and as a matter of outcomes, African American 
burial grounds have not received the same legal solicitude as White burial 
grounds.67 As Clark describes it:
[I]n contrast with law’s solicitous treatment of cemeteries gen-
erally . . . the history of legal treatment of slave and other 
long-standing African-American burial grounds has been one 
60. Brophy, supra note 11, at 1496.
61. Id. at 1498-99.
62. Id. at 1498.
63. R.S., supra note 9, at 399.
64. Clark, supra note 7, at 499. The true breadth of the lacuna in American cemetery 
law post-revolution is demonstrated by the origin of this doctrine. Courts looked back to 
Roman law where even one burial set the land apart as divine, dedicated to sacred pur-
poses.
65. Brophy, supra note 11, at 1501.
66. Clark, supra note 7, at 497.
67. Id. at 514.
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of neglect or outright disregard. These burial sites have not 
typically benefited from solicitous application of adverse pos-
session, dedication, eminent domain, trespass, criminal dese-
cration and other legal principles. Rather, they have been 
permitted to be alternatively overlooked or destroyed.68
Indeed, the recent successful treatment of the African Burial Ground Na-
tional Monument in Lower Manhattan in the 1990s represents a depar-
ture from the status quo achieved only through “substantial lobbying and 
organizing efforts.”69 In this example, 15,000 graves were discovered in 
downtown Manhattan during the construction of a federal building.70
The US General Service Administration strategy was to “plough forward 
with construction while holding required public meetings and expediting 
the archaeology excavation,” and cessation of this project through the se-
curing of National Historic Landmark was possible only through mass 
protests of development.71
This is of course only one small part of the story since cemeteries, 
like other real property, are affected by historical policies of racial segre-
gation that applied in both life and death. In 1950, an author presented as 
factual matters that “in parts of the country where racial feeling is as 
strong as religious feeling, one finds a ready tendency to prevent the in-
troduction of bodies of members of the colored race in cemeteries used 
by the whites,” and that racially discriminatory covenants were permit-
ted.72 Until recently, cemeteries routinely denied burial plot purchase op-
portunities to African Americans through different types of racially re-
strictive covenants. As late as the 1930s, around 90% of cemeteries 
contained some sort of racially restrictive covenant.73 Moreover, integra-
tion attempts were protested by threats of some form of postmortem 
White flight: “so great is the opposition . . . to the interment of colored 
persons . . . large numbers of the dead already interred therein would be 
removed . . . .”74 In other cases cemetery officials threatened: “if the col-
ored people did buy lots it would only make the neighbors angry and 
kick and remove to some other part of the cemetery or possibly to some 
68. Id.
69. Id. at 514 n.98.
70. Michael L. Blakey, African Burial Ground Project: Paradigm for Cooperation,
UNESCO 61 (2010).
71. Clark, supra note 7, at 514. See also id.
72. Jackson, supra note 14, at 380.
73. Kitty Rogers, Integrating the City of the Dead: The Integration of Cemeteries and the 
Evolution of Property Law, 1900-1969, 56 ALA. L. REV. 1153, 1156 (2005).
74. Id. at 1157.
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other cemetery.”75 Ultimately, courts applied the landmark civil rights 
decision in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co. to cemeteries, barring “all racial 
discrimination, private as well as public, in the sale or rental of proper-
ty . . .”76—though misconceptions about this fact have been recorded as 
late as the 2000 edition of American Jurisprudence, which stated that 
“regulations of cemetery association restricting the right of burial mem-
bers of a particular ethnic group or race will be upheld.”77
In an earlier case, in 1955, though concurring with an opinion up-
holding a racially discriminatory policy, Justice Dooling of the Supreme 
Court of California stated: “The good people who insist on the racial 
segregation of what is mortal in man may be shocked to learn when their 
own lives end that God has reserved no racially exclusive position for 
them in the hereafter.”78 Despite this move for equality, in many cases 
the damage may already be done. Lawsuits by African American purport-
ed rightsholders have often failed.79 These cases demonstrate legal obsta-
cles particular to this situation. Most importantly, they reveal how the in-
stitution of slavery and further systemic oppression have confounded the 
regime of abandonment and the requirement of connection or standing.
IV. Abandonment Applied
As mentioned above, courts typically require that a cemetery not be 
abandoned if burial ground rights holders are to have rights at all.80 This 
turns on evidence that the cemetery has continued to be used, or at the 
least that there is some continued recognition of its status as a cemetery.81
One court stated that “as long as a cemetery is kept and preserved as a 
resting place for the dead, with anything to indicate the existence of 
graves or as long as it is known and recognized by the public as a grave-
yard, it is not abandoned.” (alteration in original).82 Even in lieu of formal 
recognition, tombstones or markers should be enough.83
75. Id.
76. Id. at 1163.
77. Id. at 1166.
78. Id. at 1161.
79. Clark, supra note 7, at 516; Mai-Linh K. Hong, “Get Your Asphalt Off My Ances-
tors!”: Reclaiming Richmond’s African Burial Ground, 13(1) LAW, CULTURE AND THE 
HUMANITIES 81, 83 (2013).
80. Brophy, supra note 11, at 1491 nn.89-90.
81. Id.
82. C. Allen Shaffer, The Standing of the Dead: Solving the Problem of Abandoned Grave-
yards, 32 CAP. L. REV 479, 489 (2004) (quoting Heiligman v. Chambers, 338 P.2d 144, 
148 (Okla. 1959)).
83. Id.
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If the cemetery is determined to be abandoned, the easement is at 
worst entirely extinguished and at best, severely restricted.84 After disin-
terment and reinternment of the bodies elsewhere, the land where the 
easement attached, i.e. the servient estate, can be returned to trade and 
commercial use.85 It appears not to matter that the location of the ceme-
tery was lost for good reason. In one case, a cemetery was considered 
abandoned because no markers were found, even though the graves 
weren’t marked because the interred—the persecuted religious sect of 
Quakers—purposely failed to erect tombstones out of fear of desecra-
tion.86
This line of argumentation has been successfully applied to slave 
cemeteries. In Dove v. May, the Virginia Supreme Court allowed the 
Virginia State Highway Commission to build a road over a slave burial 
site that was found to be abandoned (after moving the graves to another 
site).87 In application to the University of Virginia’s own African Ameri-
can burial ground, the lack of grave markers speaks to an oppressive reali-
ty of slavery and Jim Crow era policies.
At the University of Virginia cemetery, it is likely that slaves may 
have chosen not to mark their graves out of a fear of grave robbing. The 
School of Medicine and Anatomy required cadavers for dissection and to 
this end, the bodies of slaves, free Blacks, and poor Whites were target-
ed.88 In addition, grave robbing was not illegal until 1848, well after the 
establishment of the University Cemetery in 1828.89 At least one medical 
student was verified as having been involved with grave robbing in 
1834.90 In this case, the student was shot while attempting to steal the 
body of a dead African American.91 The student survived and the man 
who shot him was “sent to the [p]enitentiary.”92 It was not until 1851 
that the University of Virginia began to send for cadavers from Rich-
mond, and even later, in 1884, that the Generally Assembly of Virginia 
made it easier to acquire cadavers legally.93 It is not surprising then that 
the enslaved and free African American communities at the University of 
Virginia would employ strategies to avoid the depraved attention of the 
grave robbers. According to one account, “it was then said that many of 
84. Cunningham, supra note 25, at 597.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 590.
87. Clark, supra note 7, at 516.
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the bodies were only logs of wood or stones, for the fear of having their 
dead taken up by the medical class . . . caused the negroes to inter their 
dead secretly, and hold the usual ceremonies over the dummy.”94 It seems 
shocking that the court would find abandonment where the indecent in-
stitution of grave robbing pressed community members to choose be-
tween memorializing the grave of their loved one and losing the rights 
bound up in burial.
In addition, the current legal regime tends to favor Eurocentric bur-
ial practices and devalue potential historical African American preferences 
for different forms of memorialization.95 African American burial practices 
often differed from those of the White community; however, at the 
Charlottesville cemetery, the east-west orientation of nearly all of the 
graves suggests the introduction of a Christian idiom, though it is unclear 
if this was the choice of the slave or the slave owner. As one scholar 
notes, “[s]urface decoration of graves with ceramic and glass containers as 
well as other material culture and plantings, often perceived by Whites as 
abandoned trash, in reality conveyed significant meanings to both the liv-
ing and the dead and contributed to the creation of a unique landscape. 
Unfortunately, this unique landscape does not clearly protect a cemetery 
against abandonment in the same way more traditionally European head-
stones might.”
Finally, even when memorials were constructed, there may have 
been preferences for non-permanent markers which, compounded with 
the potential destruction of monuments by early 20th century Whites, 
leaves little to be found today.96 During archaeological excavation, eight 
of the sixty-seven grave shafts were found to contain a stone marker.97
Six of these were apparently unworked local stone, and no markings or 
inscriptions could be found.98 The remaining two, interpreted as head-
stones, were white quartzite tabular stone that had been broken at their 
base.99 No inscriptions or markings could be found on these either.100 Ev-
idence shows that the 1915 cemetery expansion was, in part, “an inten-
tional covering, or erasure, of a pre-existing African American burial 
ground,” but it is unclear if at the time local African Americans attempt-
ed to speak out or to resist this encroachment.101 One author remarks that 
“the ability to [erase the cemetery] and the racial overtones of such a de-
94. Id. (emphasis in original omitted).
95. Id. at 57-58.
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cision are grounded in the context of institutionalized racism102 . . . .”
This seems especially unjust considering that the Department of Veterans 
Affairs has spent millions of dollars to produce and ship headstones to 
mark the graves of Confederate dead.103 While it seems proper to establish 
national cemeteries and honor veterans of any conflict, since the govern-
ment also provides headstones for veterans buried in private cemeteries, 
this—as a practical matter—creates a system in which slave cemeteries fall 
into abandonment first because their markers were maliciously destroyed 
and then because society has chosen not to preserve them.104
These realities result in a legal regime where, because of the institu-
tions of slavery and Jim Crow and a general devaluation of African 
American burial practices, cemeteries like the one at the University of 
Virginia could be determined to be abandoned. Once this determination 
is made, any easement is likely extinguished and disinterment becomes a 
possibility. Thankfully, due to the recent rededication of the cemetery 
(and reinstallation of a fence, signs, and other markers), it is extremely 
unlikely that a court would find that the cemetery is abandoned.105
However, there remains the possibility that the original easement 
was extinguished and that the new dedication creates a new easement in 
gross in the public. This is relevant because it changes who holds the 
right. Where the original easement was likely held by the descendants of 
the interred—which is to say the descendants of the University’s slaves—
the new easement would be held by the public generally. This outcome 
is arguably still problematic since the exclusivity of the right will have 
been lost. Whereas the University previously could have excluded any-
one except for the descendants due to the right of access, now the Uni-
versity would not be able to exclude anyone. Equally, the other rights in 
the easement would be implicated. Suddenly, there may be a public right 
for anyone to be buried in the cemetery, and a more general right against 
desecration.
V. Issues of Standing
As mentioned above, one element of the easement is a connection 
between the person buried and those seeking to enforce access or another 
right. The institution of slavery has made it difficult or even impossible 
for the descendants of slaves to show the kind of connection required for 
102. Id. at 67.
103. Steven I. Weiss, You Won’t Believe What the Government Spends on Confederate 
Graves, THE ATLANTIC (Jul. 19, 2013), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/
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the right of access or the kind of standing required to sue for desecra-
tion.106 Slavery promoted the separation of families by sale and engen-
dered laws that forbid recognition of slaves’ patrilineal descent. Post-
emancipation, mass migrations north muddled the record even more.107
In an instance where an alleged relative was trying to sue for dese-
cration, one scholar noted, “the legal requirement of standing was con-
founded by slavery itself, which obscured the lineages of many African 
American families, making impossible the evidence of biological descent 
the court demanded.”108 In general, lawsuits have demonstrated that only 
individuals who can prove biological descent from those interred in slave 
cemeteries have the ability to sue for injunctive or other relief if those 
graves are desecrated.109 In this situation, “if [the plaintiff’s] interest was 
unidentifiable—and in effect, unrecognizable before the law—that is 
‘precisely’ because his enslaved ancestors were stripped of identity by the 
same state that now insisted a descendant be able to identify them.”110
The solution here is not clear. Better science could allow proof in 
the form of some kind of DNA analysis or genetic testing, but a difficulty 
arises when trying to “identify the plurality of African groups that com-
prise the diaspora. Because these individuals were not culturally homoge-
neous but came from a wide range of environments, the genetic variation 
must have been diverse as well.”111 So, rather than try and get better evi-
dence, the standard could be modified.
For starters, the federal or state governments could create statutory 
standing. In 1990 the Native American Graves Protection and Repatria-
tion Act (NAGPRA) solved a parallel problem in the Native American 
context.112 NAGPRA provides for the return from federal custody of Na-
tive American mortal remains, funerary objects, sacred objects, and ob-
jects of cultural patrimony to the lineal descendants and culturally affiliat-
ed tribes.113 As one scholar observed, “[t]he stipulations of NAGPRA 
simply accommodate cultural reality in allowing Indian tribes to claim the 
same next-of-kin status that Catholics might claim if a Spanish mission 
cemetery were disturbed or that African Americans might claim if a slave 
106. Hong, supra note 79, at 93.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 83.
109. Id. at 93.
110. Id. at 96.
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cemetery were disturbed. . . .”114 To some, “NAGPRA is seen by Native 
American activities as the culmination of a civil rights movement on be-
half of the dead.”115 Of course, there is no legal reality for the equivalent 
African American claim.
Further, even this scheme is not without its own problems and 
limitations. Under NAGPRA, an Indian tribe must show a cultural or 
geographical relationship to the material to lay claim.116 NAGPRA makes 
the federal government into the gatekeeper of tribal identity since they 
can choose which groups they are willing to recognize as a tribe.117
Moreover, in instances of dispute, the federal government always main-
tains authority—such as in the case of the Kennewick Man when the re-
mains of a man at least 8,000 years old were discovered and the govern-
ment could not attribute the remains to any particular tribe.118
It can be an empirical problem as well as a formal one. NAGPRA 
has been construed to apply only to a presently existing people.119 Be-
cause of this, it is unclear how any individual remains found without arti-
facts could be Native American and therefore subject to NAGPRA. As 
one observer puts it “bones without associated artifacts cannot be con-
nected to a particular tribe except by geography and oral traditions.”120
Some of these similar issues might arise with the slave cemetery in 
Charlottesville. As an initial matter, it is not certain that the cemetery 
under analysis actually is a slave cemetery at all. One possibility is that it is 
an older White cemetery that merely predates the University Ceme-
tery,121 but in the end, the evidence suggests it is in fact a slave cemetery. 
For one, almost all of the burials in the University Cemetery have been 
positively identified, and there are no other known sites of likely African 
American burial.122 Further, in some 19th century sources the site’s use as a 
slave cemetery was mentioned.123 One researcher compiled a list of en-
slaved African Americans who died at the University of Virginia between 
114. Steve Russell, Law and Bones: Religion, Science, and the Discourse of Empire, 99 
RADICAL HIST. REV. 214, 218 (2007).
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1853-61, and this list could be used to inform as to who the occupants of 
the graves are and who might be their descendants.124 But as University 
Landscape Architect Mary Hughes, who worked on the project, stated: 
“I’m sure they will look as hard as they can to find definitive infor-
mation, but it may be that we will never have a definitive answer.”125
Currently, any descendants of the enslaved African Americans in the 
Charlottesville cemetery would have a difficult time proving: (1) it is a 
slave cemetery, (2) the identity of the buried person, and (3) a relation to 
the buried person. Statutory standing could relieve some of this pressure, 
either by deferring to a descendant community or by creating standing 
for the public more generally.
VI. Slave Cemeteries as Public Sites
Ideally, slave cemeteries should be construed as easements in gross 
held by the pubic and composed of a right to access, a right against dese-
cration, and a right against alienation or inconsistent use. The right to 
further burial, which is often spoken of as a component of burial rights, is 
first, not spoken of universally, and second, probably too problematic to 
apply under this construction. If the easement in gross held by the public 
allowed anyone to be buried there—assuming sufficient space—this 
would surely frustrate the reasons slave cemeteries should receive special 
treatment in the first place (e.g. a reparations theory or as a memorial to 
historical segregation and oppressive practices). This construction helps 
eliminate wrinkles created by the abandonment and standing issues.
As far as the abandonment issue is concerned, this construction 
helps eliminate the need to prove that the easement was not abandoned. 
While it is true the exclusive right may (or may not) have vanished, that 
right is not greater than what would be vested in the public generally. 
This is to say that everyone would have a right to access the cemetery. In 
a world where the easement is only held by the relatives, the owner of 
the servient estate cannot exclude the relatives from the land. But in a 
world where the easement is held by everyone, the owner of the servient
estate cannot exclude anyone. If a slave grave were discovered in a pri-
vate cemetery, the effect of this policy is that the landowner would not 
be able to exclude anyone from visiting the cemetery.126 The exclusive 
124. Id. at 64.
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right does have its appeal: “it also offers the descendants of slaves a piece 
of property—an easement for access—however small, that their ancestors 
left for them.”127 However, the benefit of construing the right as a public 
easement is that helps ensure that the cemetery, as a memorial, keeps the 
history of slavery visible – rather than built over or hidden away on pri-
vate estates.128 Under a reparations theory, there are two benefits: (1) tak-
ing the property interest off the market shows respect, and (2) the de-
scendants of slaves are offered a piece of property.129 As one commentator 
noted, “[i]n the end, preservation of land associated with death and burial 
of non-Whites can be a powerful form (among others) of repatriation for 
histories of racial oppression.”130 Property is valuable, even an easement, 
and its donation to the public would not be meaningless. She argues that 
“[t]he decision to use property to preserve off-market land associated 
with the death and burial of historically subordinated peoples can be an 
important step in redress and rebuilding of trust. . . .”131 To the second 
point, while this interest would not be going directly and exclusively to 
the descendants of the slave, it would be going to everyone, and so the 
descendants would all be accounted for among those benefitting. It is im-
portant to notice that because of the institution of slavery, most or even 
all servient estates would have been the land of the original slave owner.
Finally, the standing problem that arises in desecration cases can be 
partially resolved through thinking of the easement as public. One court 
described an easement, when abandoned, along the lines of this outcome: 
“The rights of the descendants, in this situation, become merged with the 
right of the public generally to insist that due respect be paid to the sanc-
tity of human remains and human burial grounds if they should be un-
covered inadvertently.”132 As a policy matter, if everyone had standing to 
sue for desecration—either statutorily or through other means—
cemeteries would receive the protection they deserve. If anyone saw the 
owner of the land destroying monuments by driving a tractor across the 
graves, they would be able to sue for desecration. Because the full scope 
of legal and equitable relief is available, people would be motivated to go 
to court to enforce these rights. The cemetery would be protected if 
construction were enjoined, but people would be vigilant in search of 
damages (maybe even punitive damages) that would go to the litigant.133
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Just as with qui tam, the hope of compensation motivates people to do 
the right thing.
As a practical matter, legislators should come together at a state and 
federal level in order to pass statutes codifying a public easement in aban-
doned slave cemeteries and to create broad statutory standing. There is at 
least one state statue in Oklahoma that does, in fact, appear to use emi-
nent domain to create an easement with a right to access abandoned 
cemeteries on private property.134 It states: “any relative of the deceased 
who wishes to visit an abandoned cemetery which is completely sur-
rounded by privately owned land . . . shall have the right to reasonable 
ingress or egress for the purpose of visiting such cemetery.”135 However, 
as Brophy notes, the statute also specifically claims that “this section shall 
not be interpreted to allow the creation of an easement or claim of ease-
ment . . . .”136
However, even in absence of formal legislative action, courts could 
potentially apply the flexible and powerful doctrine of solicitude and de-
velop this regime on their own. Indeed, as mentioned above, cemetery 
law was created seemingly ex nihilo by American jurists in the wake of the 
Revolution. Despite some regulatory development in the 20th century, 
courts have often applied solicitude to modify property doctrine when 
dealing with sites associated with death and burial. It is not impossible 
that judges could continue to find, through solicitude, new exceptions 
buried in this sacred legal space.
In either case, the use of eminent domain in this context raises sev-
eral problems. If the slave cemetery has been found to be abandoned and 
the easement extinguished, the creation of a new public right will proba-
bly require compensation of the landowner. As a primary matter, the land 
needs to be taken for legitimate public use. In 1954, “the Supreme Court 
in Berman v. Parker recognized ‘fostering spirituality’ as a valid public use 
for purposes of exercising public domain authority,” and this rationale 
was used to create Gettysburg and Antietam.137 Accordingly, it seems it 
would be a legitimate public interest to foster spirituality through pre-
serving these abandoned slave cemeteries, not to mention the importance 
of preserving history or a under reparations theory. Payment of the land-
owners could be unpopular as a matter of public policy. Certainly, the 
fair market value of a cemetery could not be terribly high, as inconsistent 
use is already constrained, but in the case of an abandoned cemetery the 
landowner may be free to disinter the bodies, reinter them elsewhere, 
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and then return it to the typical course of trade and commerce.138 Should 
the landowner dare to disturb the dead, the fair market value in this case 
could be considerably higher.
VII. Conclusion
In Charlottesville, it may never come to all this. The University of 
Virginia is an agent of the government and may be protected by sover-
eign immunity. Moreover, the University has taken great care in its anal-
ysis and moved forward with sensitivity, and indeed, rededicated the 
cemetery to the public. Because of this, they likely would no longer be 
able to exclude the public—not that they would want to. Thankfully, the 
community was consciously involved, and there are ongoing efforts to 
further study and interpret this sacred space. However, as the story un-
folds, it is not clear that even this degree of delicacy is enough. The de-
scendants of slaves deserve something more than a decision not to rede-
velop or exclude. The issue of standing has not been resolved, and likely 
there would be no liability in the case of desecration. Slavery was ex-
ploited to build Jefferson’s University brick by brick, and now it is clear 
that slavery’s long shadow must be dismantled the same way, a piece at a 
time. It does not take much to make the mental leap: to construe the 
property interest of all abandoned slave cemeteries as a public easement in 
gross with a right of access, rights against desecration, and restrictions on 
alienation. It seems this show of solicitude is sorely needed to give these 
sixty-seven dead the same respect seen in the stately University Ceme-
tery, right next door. In any event, it is a start.
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